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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
does not result in any injustice to the shipowner. 6 Finally, these circuits
reason that even if an injustice does result to a shipowner, only Congress
has the authority to correct such injustices by amending the LHWCA. " 7
Recently in Allied Towing Corp. v. Tatem,5 the Fourth Circuit extended
the application of the Edmonds reduction of damages formula to a ship-
worker injured by the joint negligence of a shipowner and the ship-
worker's employer. Thus, the Fourth Circuit appears to be willing to ex-
tend the application of a reduction of damages according to a proportional
fault formula to all worker's covered by section 905(b).51 Thus, despite the
contrary position of other circuits, a shipowner in the Fourth Circuit will
be liable in any LHWCA action only according to its own degree of fault.
WARREN L. JERVEY
Im. BANKRUPTCY
Upon initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, the creditors' of a bankrupt
debtor are primarily concerned with the distribution and allocation of the
" See Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.
1978) (shipowner's liability for longshoreman's full damages offset by reduction allowable for
longshoreman's contributory negligence and indemnity from negligent third parties other
than longshoreman's stevedore); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th
Cir. 1975) (joint tortfeasor cannot complain if he is held liable for injured party's full dam-
ages).
" Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888-89 (5th Cir.
1978); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1975).
580 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1978). In Allied Towing, the plaintiff, a barge owner, moved for
summary judgment on a worker's claim against the shipowner arising from an industrial
accident aboard the owner's barge. Id. at 703. Since Allied was acting as the worker's immedi-
ate employer, Allied claimed that it should enjoy the statutory immunity of § 905(a) of the
LHWCA. Id. at 704. Contrary to Allied's claim, the court held that merely being the worker's
immediate employer would not give Allied full immunity from his claim. Id. Instead, the
court held that the third sentence of § 905(b), which provides that a shipworker cannot sue a
shipowner for injuries caused by the negligence of any person providing ship repair or work
service to the owner, is to be read in apportionment terms. Id., citing Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978). Therefore, Allied was relieved of
liability for the worker's injury only to the extent that the worker's fellow employees or the
owner's personnel in charge of the repair work proportionally caused the worker's injury. 580
F.2d at 704.
1' The provisions of § 905(b) apply to all persons covered by the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. §
905(b) (1976). The LHWCA covers any person engaged in maritime employment including
longshoremen and all classifications of harbor workers. Id. § 902(3). Only crew members,
masters, or officers of a vessel are exluded specifically from LHWCA coverage. Id.
I Under the Bankruptcy Act, a creditor includes anyone who owns a debt, demand or
claim provable in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 1(11), 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1976). Secured
creditors comprise a sub-category within the general classification of creditors. Essentially, a
secured creditor is one whose debts are secured by the property of the bankrupt and are of a
nature assignable under the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act § 1(28), 11 U.S.C. § 1(28)
(1976); cf. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (defining secured party). See generally Moo, The Secured
Creditor in Bankruptcy, 47 Am. BANKR. L. J. 23 (1973).
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bankrupt's assets.2 A creditor's share of the bankrupt estate is determined
by his classification as secured or general,3 and according to a characteriza-
tion of the assets comprising the estate.4 A conflict between the general
creditors and a secured creditor may arise if the secured creditor's lien5
covers income-producing property.' The ownership of the income gener-
ated by such property becomes the focus of controversy when the general
creditors urge its inclusion in the bankrupt estate7 and the secured creditor
claims the income as further security for his defaulted loan.
8
2 Each creditor is anxious to recoup as much of the debt owed to him by the bankrupt
debtor as possible. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1976) vests the bankruptcy
court with jurisdiction to "[clause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to
money, and distributed and determine controversies in relation thereto ......
I See note 1 supra. A creditor with a valid lien would be classified as a secured creditor
and would have priority over the general creditors in any scheme of distribution. D. EPSTEIN,
DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 181 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN]. A lien is defined as
"a charge or security or incumbrance upon property." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1072 (4th ed.
1957). The bankruptcy court determines the validity of a lien. EPSTEIN, supra at 183.
During bankruptcy, the general creditors are paid on a pro rata basis after the secured
creditors with valid liens and those general creditors with priority are paid. Bankruptcy Act
§ 65(a), 11 U.S.C. 105(a) (1976). The expenses of administration and certain tax obligations
are among those claims which are given priority. See Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1976). In the case of Golden Enterprises, the bankrupt estate would likely be exhausted upon
satisfaction of the attorneys' fees and a United States government tax claim of approximately
$50,000. Golden Enter., Inc. v. United States (In re Golden), 566 F.2d 1207, 1209, 1211 (4th
Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom., Butner v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 914 (1979).
The bankrupt estate generally consists of all property owned by the bankrupt at the
time a petition in bankruptcy is filed. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1976).
See generally 3 H. REMINGTON, REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 1177 (6th ed. 1955) [hereinafter
cited as REMINGTON]. The definition of "property" is liberally construed to give creditors
everything of value. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); In re Kokoszha, 479 F.2d 990,
994 (2d Cir. 1973).
See note 3 supra.
Income produced by secured assets may take various forms, such as proceeds from
crops grown on secured property, Pollack v. Sampsell, 174 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1949), or
rents collected from tenants occupying mortgaged premises. Petition of Cox, 15 F.2d 764, 764
(1st Cir. 1926); cf. U.C.C. §§ 9-207, 9-306 (rights and duties when collateral in secured party's
possession; treatment of proceeds resulting from sale of collateral).
The interests of the unsecured, or general, creditors are represented by the trustee ap-
pointed to administer the estate. See note 47 infra. In Chapter XI proceedings, creditors are
defined as those holders of unsecured debts, demands or claims. Bankruptcy Act § 307(1),
11 U.S.C. § 707(1) (1976). Theoretically, Chapter XI arrangements affect only the rights of
unsecured creditors. In practice, however, a secured creditor's rights would be affected, since
the property securing his loan is subject to the Chapter XI arrangement. Bankruptcy Act §
308, 11 U.S.C. § 708 (1976). See generally Anderson, Secured Creditors: Their Rights and
Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 36 LA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Anderson]; Miller, The Automatic Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A Catalyst for Reha-
bilitation or an Abuse of Creditors' Rights?, 94 BANKING L. J. 676, 677 n.7 (1977).
1 Income included in the bankrupt estate is divided among the general creditors pursuant
to § 65 of the Bankruptcy Act. See Bankruptcy Act § 65, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1976). See generally
note 3 supra.
See, e.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron
Co., 99 F.2d 642, 645 (3d Cir. 1938) (mortgage creditor entitled to net income of mortgaged




In Golden Enterprises, Inc. v. United States (In re Golden),' the Fourth
Circuit considered a claim by William E. Butner10 that as mortgagee" he
was entitled to the income generated by property securing defaulted sec-
ond mortgages. 2 Specifically, Butner claimed ownership of the accrued
rents"3 issuing from the encumbered property during bankruptcy proceed-
ings after default," but prior to foreclosure of.the mortgages. 5 The Fourth
Circuit held that the income produced during bankruptcy proceedings
comprised a part of the bankrupt estate, since the mortgagee did not
establish that he would have attempted to assert a security interest in the
income had bankruptcy proceedings not been instituted. 6 Prior to Golden,
the Fourth Circuit had not considered the secured creditor's right to in-
come produced during bankruptcy.17 Golden presented a more complex
situation than the basic issue of income allocation" in light of the proce-
566 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nor., Butner v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 914
(1979).
0 Id. at 1208. Butner held second mortages on Golden Enterprises' property totalling
$360,000. Upon initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings, Butner purchased the property at
a court-ordered sale for $174,000, offsetting the purchase price against Golden's debt to him.
The unsatisfied balance on the debt following the sale totalled $186,000. Id. at 1209.
"1 A mortgage is an appropriation of real or personal property as security for a debt.
Killebrew v. Hines, 104 N.C. 182, _ 10 S.E. 159, 162 (1889). The mortgagee is the holder
of the lien on the mortgaged property. See 3 REMiNGTON, supra note 4, at § 1315.
IS In re Golden Enterprises, Bankrupt No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 16,
1976). Essentially, a second mortgagee promises to lend the mortgagor the amount of the first
mortgage by paying that amounto the first mortgagee, while the mortgaged property serves
as security for the loan. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 266 (1970). The first mortgages in Golden
were held by several financial institutions and the second mortgages were held by Butner and
other individuals. 566 F.2d at 1208. By assignment, Butner became the sole owner and holder
of the second mortgages. No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 2.
"1 566 F.2d at 1209. Rents on the property began to accrue when Golden Enterprises filed
its petition under Chapter XI, Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976), one
year and nine months prior to adjudication. A court-appointed agent made authorized dis-
bursements until adjudication, at which time a trustee was appointed. The trustee continued
to make disbursements as authorized by the bankruptcy court. The accrued rents after
disbursements amounted to $162,971.32. 566 F.2d at 1209.
" Neither the district court opinion, nor the Fourth Circuit opinion made clear the exact
date of Golden's default under the second mortgages. The Fourth Circuit indicated, however,
that default occurred by the time Golden was adjudicated bankrupt on February 14, 1975.
566 F.2d at 1209.
11 Foreclosure of the mortgages occurred upon the court-ordered sale of the property. Id.
see note 10 supra.
"1 566 F.2d at 1211. Upon ruling in favor of the general creditors, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court and reinstated the ruling of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 1209.
,7 Id.
" The circuits are not in accord over the effect of bankruptcy on the secured creditor.
The Third and Seventh Circuits are most sympathetic to the secured creditor, perceiving the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings as depriving the creditor of a remedy upon default of a
loan, see Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 99
F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1938); In re Wakey, 50 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1931); text accompanying notes
70-73 infra, while the Eighth and Ninth Circuits view the same situation as a suspension of
the creditor's remedy, permitting the creditor to reinstate the suspended rights by following
proper procedure. See Groves v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 373 F.2d 440 (9th Cir.
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dure followed by Golden Enterprises prior to its adjudication as bank-
rupt.'"
In 1973, Golden Enterprises filed a petition for arrangement"0 under
Chapter X12' of the Bankruptcy Act.2 2 A plan of arrangement was never
confirmed, however, and the proceeding was converted into one of straight
bankruptcy. 2 While the petition for the Chapter XI arrangement was
pending, the court appointed an agent" to collect rents and to make au-
thorized disbursements.2 During the pendency of the petition for arrange-
ment, the interest and principal payments due on the mortgages were paid
by the agent to the mortgagee. 21 Upon adjudication of the debtor as bank-
1967); Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein, 119 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1941); text
accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
,1 566 F.2d at 1209. Golden Enterprises first entered the bankruptcy arena by filing a
petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 1209. The Chapter XI case was
transformed into a straight bankruptcy, causing procedural difficulties in ascertaining But-
ner's rights to the income. Id; see text accompanying notes 20-31 infra.
2 An arrangement is a debtor's plan to provide for the satisfaction of his unsecured
debts. The arrangement may be on any terms, including alternatives such as settlement or
extension of the time of payment. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976). An
arrangement filed under Chapter XI is confirmed by the consent of a majority of the unse-
cured creditors. Bankruptcy Act § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1976). A "petition for arrangement"
may be filed with the bankruptcy court under Chapter XI as a proposal of the arrangement.
Bankruptcy Act § 306(5), 11 U.S.C. § 706(5) (1976). Such a petition may be filed by a debtor
in a pending bankruptcy proceeding before or after his adjudication in bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 321, 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1976). See also Bankruptcy Act § 322, 11 U.S.C. § 722
(1976) (debtor may file original petition under Chapter XI in absence of pending bankruptcy
proceeding).
2, Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976). Chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is a debtor rehabilitation provision available to individuals, partnerships and
corporations. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 145-46. The purpose of the proceeding is to allow the
debtor to rehabilitate his finances by effecting an arrangement with his unsecured creditors.
The ultimate rehabilitation of the debtor is the goal of the Chapter XI proceeding. Nicholas
v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687 (1966). See generally 9 REMINGTON, supra note 4, at §§
3564-3565; Anderson, supra note 6, at 1-2.
2 566 F.2d at 1209. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
1-1255 (1976).
2 Straight bankruptcy necessitates a liquidation of the debtor's property and the distri-
bution of the proceeds among the creditors of the bankrupt debtor. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at
136. A straight bankruptcy proceeding is commenced by filing a petition in the appropriate
court. FED. BANKR. R. 101.
In Golden, such a plan of arrangement was not confirmed. 566 F.2d at 1209. If confirma-
tion is not forthcoming, the bankruptcy court is empowered to either adjudge the debtor as
bankrupt or dismiss the proceeding altogether, whichever is in the creditor's best interests.
See Bankruptcy Act § 376(2), 11 U.S.C. § 776(2) (1976).
24 566 F.2d at 1209. On the motion of the debtor's attorney, the court appointed S.J.
Golden as agent. No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 6.
566 F.2d at 1209; see Bankruptcy Act § 322, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970). The grant of power
to a receiver or agent is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court and the authority of
the receiver or agent is subject to court control. In re State Fin. Serv., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 129,
132 (M.D. La. 1977). See generally FED. BANKR. R. 201(1). In Golden, the authority of the
agent consisted of collecting rents and paying taxes, insurance, and interest and principal
payments due on the mortgages. 566 F.2d at 1209.
28 566 F.2d at 1209.
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rupt, a trustee was appointed to collect rents and make disbursements
as authorized by the bankruptcy court.2 However, the court directed that
the trustee make no further payments on the mortgages. 29 Butner claimed
that the debt owing to him should be satisfied with the fund remaining
after the trustee made the authorized disbursements."1
The Fourth Circuit determined that for Butner to be entitled to the
disputed income he should have unequivocally asserted his claim to the
generated income. 32 The court's determination was based on the fact that
absent bankruptcy proceedings, even in the event of default, a mortgagee
subject to North Carolina law3 is not entitled to any income generated by
mortgaged property until he has taken possession of the property.34 Thus,
the court reasoned that before Butner could receive the income, the law
required that he gain possession of the mortgaged property through foreclo-
sure of the mortgages." The Fourth Circuit focused on the procedure fol-
lowed by Butner during the bankruptcy proceeding in evaluating the mort-
gagee's efforts to gain possession of the mortgaged property to determine
the validity of his claim to the income fund. 6 The court noted that during
the bankruptcy Butner neither requested a sequestration of the rents nor
the appointment of a receivex to collect them.37 This observation of the
Fourth Circuit suggests alternative rationales which may have been em-
2 566 F.2d at 1209; see Bankruptcy Act § 378(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 778(a)(2) (1976); text
accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
566 F.2d at 1209; see notes 13 & 25 supra.
566 F.2d at 1209. At the time Golden Enterprises was adjudicated bankrupt on Febru-
ary 14, 1975, nearly two years after the initial filing of the petition of arrangement pursuant
to Chapter XI, the Butner mortgages were in default. No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 1; see note
14 supra.
3 See note 10 supra.
31 Id.; see note 13 supra.
" 566 F.2d at 1210; see text accompanying notes 37-46 infra.
3 566 F.2d at 1210. State law is controlling where there is a mortgage involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The Federal courts follow the general rule that the mortgagee is
entitled to income generated by the mortgaged premises only if he takes actual possession,
after a receiver takes possession in his behalf, or after he has made a proper demand for
possession and has been refused, In re Brose, 254 F. 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1918), unless the law of
the state of the situs of the mortgaged property applies a different rule, in which case the
state's rule will apply. Id.; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 4A W. COLMR ON
BANKRUPTCY § 70.16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CoLLMR]. See generally Hill, The Erie
Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1013 (1953); Note, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents
and Profits Following a Petition in Bankruptcy, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1388, 1390 (1975)..
U Under North Carolina law, a mortgagee has no right to the income generated by the
mortgaged property, even after default. Parker Co. v. Commercial Bank, 204 N.C. 432, -,
168 S.E. 681, 682 (1933). Such a right arises only after the mortgagee has taken possession of
the mortgaged property either by consent of the mortgagor or pursuant to a court order. Id.
See generally ABA Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, Disposition of Rents and
Profits After Mortgage Default 2 RAL PRop. PROB. TR. J. 601, 623 (1967).
" 566 F.2d at 1210; see Kistler v. Wilmington Dev. Co., 205 N.C. 755, _ , 172 S.E. 413,
414 (1934).
u 566 F.2d at 1210.
37 Id.; see text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
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ployed in denying Butner's claim to the income.18 First, if the court did not
consider the motion made by the debtor's attorney for appointment of an
agent to collect rents as requested by Butner, then the literal provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act would not be satisfied. 9 Similarly, the statutory re-
quirements of the Act" would not be satisfied if any action undertaken
during the pendency of the Chapter XI petition for arrangement and prior
to adjudication was not considered by the court as being "during bank-
ruptcy."'"
The bankruptcy court appointed an agent to collect rents in response
to the motion made by the debtor's attorney." Therefore, this motion for
the appointment of a receiver, which was made on behalf of the secured
creditors, including Butner,43 should have qualified as a formal request for
such appointment under Bankruptcy Rule 201.11 After bankruptcy ensued,
a trustee was appointed by the court in compliance with Rule 122.15 Butner
argued that a further request by him for the appointment of a receiver after
adjudication was not warranted since the trustee appointed by the court
served the same function as a receiver.4" In rejecting Butner's argument,
the Fourth Circuit stated that the adjudication of bankruptcy terminated
the receivership created in response to the initial motion prior to adjudica-
tion, and that the trustee collected the rents for the bankrupt estate.8
However, a receiver's appointment under Bankruptcy Rule 201
1 The Fourth Circuit's opinion does not indicate which of these rationales, if either, was
used in deciding the case. See 566 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1978).
31 See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
40 See 566 F.2d at 1210. But see text accompanying notes 51-63 infra.
41 See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
42 No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 6. The court gave no recognition to the fact that the agent
was appointed pursuant to a motion made on behalf of the secured creditors, including
Butner. 566 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1978).
41 No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 6.
14 FED. BANKR. R. 201(c), provides that an agent may not be appointed except upon
application to the bankruptcy court.
41 FED. BANKR. R. 122 addresses the situation presented by a chapter case conversion into
straight bankruptcy. The rule provides that "the case shall be deemed to have been comm-
enced as of the date of the filing of the first petition initiating a case under the Act and shall
be conducted as far as possible as if no petition commencing a chapter case had been filed."
FED. BANKR. R. 122(1). In addition, the rule provides for the appointment of a trustee. FED.
BANKR. R. 122(4).
11 566 F.2d at 1210. Although the court directed the trustee to withhold payments on the
mortgages, the function of the trustee in collecting rents and making authorized disburse-
ments was identical to that of the agent since both acted to preserve the assets of the debtor.
Id.
'4 Id.
41 Id.; cf. McNellis v. Raymond, 420 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1970) (trustee serves dual
function of representing both bankrupt and creditors). In Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston,
45 F.2d 28, 32 (8th Cir. 1930), the Eighth Circuit considered whether mortgagees were re-
quired to move separately for the appointment of a receiver to collect and hold rents issuing
from mortgaged property. The receiver who collected the rents acted on behalf of all creditors.
The court ruled that an assumption could be made that the receiver held the rents and issues
for the party entitled to them and therefore, the mortgagees had no reason to request the
appointment of another receiver. Id.
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automatically terminates when a trustee qualifies to serve.49 In view of this
termination, the appointment of a qualified trustee obviates the need to
appoint a receiver. Thus, the court's insistence that Butner should have
requested the appointment of a receiver subsequent to the adjudication of
bankruptcy is not supported by either statutory authority5 or logic.'
In addition to the evaluation of the trustee's purpose and function, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Butner had not requested the sequestration
of rents or the appointment of a receiver "during bankruptcy" because the
proceedings were not "bankruptcy proceedings" until the date of adjudica-
tion. 2 The court viewed the adjudication of bankruptcy as the annulment
of all acts performed pursuant to the Chapter XI petition 3 and held that
since the trustee's appointment terminated the receivership, theoretically,
the motion for appointment of the receiver was not made "during bank-
ruptcy."5 Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not identify what consti-
tutes ."during bankruptcy" under the statutory provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and Rules. 5 Rule 12251 provides that a case converted from a
chapter proceeding into straight bankruptcy is to be conducted as though
the chapter case had not been filed." Thus, the date of the initial filing of
the chapter case petition is deemed to be the commencement of bank-
ruptcy. In addition, section 378 of the Bankruptcy Act 8 expressly states
that the bankruptcy proceeding continues as though a voluntary petition
for adjudication in bankruptcy had been filed at the time of the initial
Chapter XI filing.59 Consequently, a debtor is adjudicated bankrupt as of
the date of an initial filing. 0 Rule 122 addresses the issue of continuity
from the perspective of a straight bankruptcy,6' while section 378 is a
Chapter XI provision.12 Together, they illustrate the objective of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to assure the continuity of proceedings. 3 Clearly, these statu-
"9 FED. BArKn. R. 201(a) provides that the appointment of a receiver is to be terminated
by the bankruptcy court as soon as a trustee qualifies to serve.
See FED. BANKR. R. 122 & 201; text accompanying notes 42-49 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 42-49 supra.
12 566 F.2d at 1210.
3Id.
u Id.
" See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra. The court limited the term "during bank-
ruptcy" to the period of straight bankruptcy. 566 F.2d at 1210.
" FED. BANKR. R. 122.
'7 FED. BANKR. R. 122(a); see note 45 supra.
Bankruptcy Act § 378, 11 U.S.C. § 778 (1976).
Bankruptcy Act § 378(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 778(a)(2) (1976).
"Id.
" FED. BANKR. R. 122; see note 63 infra.
" Bankruptcy Act § 378, 11 U.S.C. § 778 (1976); see note 63 infra.
1 In re Botany Indus., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 234, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Botany Industries,
after termination of Chapter XI proceedings, the case progressed to liquidation in straight
bankruptcy. The court emphasized that the general scheme of the Bankruptcy Act and Rules
calls for the treatment of converted cases as single proceedings whenever possible. Id., citing
United States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 103
(1966). The relationship between Rule 122 and § 378 is viewed as supportive of this position
since each reflects the concept of continuity of proceedings. Id.
1979]
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tory provisions indicate that a converted case should be viewed as a single
proceeding, embracing "a concept of unitary administration."" Thus, the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that an action instituted prior to a chapter case
conversion is not "during bankruptcy" disregards the thrust of the statu-
tory mandates.
The Golden court also evaluated Butner's efforts to foreclose on the
mortgaged property, noting that Butner took no formal action to have the
property abandoned, a prerequisite to foreclosure.6 5 While the court ac-
knowledged that Butner made several informal requests for abandonment
of the property,"8 these requests were not recognized as valid indicia of the
mortgagee's efforts to gain possession of the property." Apparently, the
Fourth Circuit resolved that Butner should have filed a formal complaint
under Rule 7018 to render his informal efforts for abandonment indicative
of an attempt to initiate foreclosure." However, the court appears more
demanding of the mortgagee than necessary. Since the bankruptcy court
is equitable in nature," it should examine all of the relevant circumstances
before determining with whom the equities lie.7 The district court recog-
nized the equitable considerations involved 72 and concluded that Butner's
efforts to secure abandonment were sufficient to evidence an attempt to
foreclose, thus entitling him to the income generated by the property.73 In
view of Butner's requests to the bankruptcy court and the Fourth Circuit's
apparent disregard of any extenuating equitable considerations,74 the
Golden court's refusal to recognize Butner's efforts to foreclose on the
" Id.
65 566 F.2d at 1210-11.
" Id. at 1210. According to the district court opinion, Butner contended that he and the
first mortgagees made numerous futile attempts to get the bankruptcy court to abandon the
property to them, thus allowing them to initiate foreclosure proceedings. No. ST-B-73-6, slip
op. at 5.
0 566 F.2d at 1211; see text accompanying notes 68-69 infra.
" FED. BAmmK. R. 701 deals with the initiation of a proceeding before a bankruptcy judge
by a party attempting to establish an interest in property belonging to a bankrupt debtor.
11 See text accompanying note 67 supra. The court stated explicitly that since no formal
action was taken under Rule 701, the mortgagee had not fulfilled the necessary requirements
for abandonment and foreclosure. 566 F.2d at 1211. The informal action for abandonment,
though acknowledged, was disregarded by the court. Id. at 1210.
70 Under § 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy courts are invested with equitable
powers to exercise their jurisdiction. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1976). In
addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the bankruptcy courts are to
afford overriding consideration to equitable principles. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S.
99, 103 (1966). See generally Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. United States Realty & Imp. Co.,
310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 303, 308 (1939).
71 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939); see note 70 supra.
72 No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 7. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the district court's
recognition of equitable considerations, but stated that those considerations were not enumer-
ated in the district court's opinion, and that none existed in favor of the mortgagee that were
ascertainable from the record. 566 F.2d at 1211. This observation apparently contradicts those
made by the district court. No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 7; see text accompanying note 73 infra.
7 No. ST-B-73-6, slip op. at 7.
1, See 566 F.2d at 1211; text accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra.
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property appears harsh and unreasonable.
Absent the procedural complications peculiar to Golden,"5 two theories
are employed by other circuits in evaluating the secured creditor's right to
income generated by secured property during bankruptcy proceedings."
The Third and Seventh Circuits have viewed the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings by or on behalf of the debtor as depriving a secured creditor
of legal remedies to which he would otherwise be entitled upon default of
the secured loan." To counterbalance this deprivation of remedy, the se-
cured creditor is accorded ownership status of the income generated by the
security to the extent of the unsatisfied debt. 8 Since the income is consid-
ered to be additional security on the mortgage loan, the income is allocated
to the mortgagee,"9 resulting in an equitable solution to protect the secured
creditor's risk.8 In deciding Golden, however, the Fourth Circuit adopted
an alternative approach, employed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
which views the bankruptcy proceedings as suspending the secured credi-
tor's legal rights.81 Instead of automatically allocating the income to the
secured creditor, this approach requires that before the secured creditor's
claim on the income is allowed to prevail, 2 the creditor must petition the
bankruptcy court for a sequestration order, obtain the appointment of a
,' See note 19 and text accompanying notes 20-31 supra.
7 See Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. v. Williams, 506 F.2d 1242, 1243 (4th Cir. 1974); text
accompanying notes 77-85 infra.
n The bankruptcy proceeding automatically vests title in the trustee, consequently de-
priving the mortgagee of his foreclosure remedy. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 99 F.2d 642, 646 (3d cir. 1938). Because of the
deprivation of the foreclosure remedy, inaccessibility of the income to the mortgagee is inevi-
table. Id. at 645. Thus, the mortgagee would have no right to the income absent foreclosure
and possession. Id. See also In re Wakey, 50 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1931); Bindseil v. Liberty Trust
Co., 248 F. 112 (3d Cir. 1917).
78 Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 99 F.2d
642, 645 (3d Cir. 1938). The court in Central Hanover emphasized equitable principles in
determining that ownership in the income vested in the mortgagee with the removal of the
property from the insolvent debtor's possession. Id. The court drew an analogy between a
straight bankruptcy proceeding and a reorganization proceeding where the property is under
the supervision of the court, since a mortgagee is similarly enjoined from pursuing the remedy
of foreclosure. Id. The claim of a mortgagee to the generated income is limited to the amount
necessary to satisfy the debt owed to him. Id.
Id.
The Third Circuit has stated that after bankruptcy proceedings have vested title to
the debtor's property in the trustee, equity demands that the secured creditor become owner
of the income. Bindseil v. Liberty Trust Co., 248 F. 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1917). Since the income
was generated by the mortgaged property, it should not be diverted from the secured creditor
to the general creditors. Id. I
11 See, e.g., Groves v. Fresno Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 373 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1967);
Pollack v. Sampsell, 174 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1949); Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v.
Weinstein, 119 F.2d 120, 123 (8th Cir. 1941); Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston, 45 F.2d 28,
30 (8th Cir. 1930).
" Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein, 119 F.2d 120, 123 (8th Cir. 1941). In
denying the mortgagee's claim to an income fund, the Weinstein court noted the lack of
positive action by the mortgagee to assert his claim to the income generated by the mortgaged
property. Id. See generally 4A COLUER, supra note 33, at 70.16.
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receiver to collect the income, or secure the court's consent to foreclose.
Such an approach enables the mortgagee to receive the income from the
mortgaged property, but only after he secures his rights as he would if the
mortgagor were not involved in bankruptcy proceedings." Although bank-
ruptcy should not unnecessarily harm a secured creditor, he should not be
excused from his responsibilities as a party to the mortgage. A mortgagor,
as legal owner of the mortgaged property, is entitled to rents and profits
issuing from the property absent default and foreclosure., Thus, the bank-
rupt estate, as legal owner,8 should similarly receive the income absent
unequivocal action by the mortgagee to secure the income.
The Fourth Circuit favored the position espoused by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits because it best ensured a decision consistent with one that
a state court would reach in the case of a defaulted mortgage if bankruptcy
proceedings were not involved.8" Although the theoretical basis employed
by the court is sound in this regard, the court's analysis of the facts is
narrow and obtuse. The court failed to discuss fully the facts of the case
in relation to the theoretical base which has been established. Since Butner
adequately demonstrated that he followed the requisite procedure to se-
cure the income generated by the mortgaged property, 7 he should have
prevailed on his claim for the income. The result in Golden is deceptive,
however, for although the court's analysis of the mortgagee's actions is
challengeable," it laid a solid foundation for analyzing the issue of income
allocation when income is generated by secured property during bank-
ruptcy. By aligning with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has indicated an intention to deal equitably with creditors involved
in bankruptcy proceedings. The court demonstrated, however, the ease
with which a court may stray from an equitable doctrine, arrive at a wholly
inequitable result and thereby defeat its own efforts. 9
SALLY F. PRu=r
13 Absent bankruptcy, Butner would have been required to foreclose on the mortgage
before becoming entitled to the income from the property. See Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C.
356, _, 98 S.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1957).
Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, _ 98 S.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1957).
See note 77 supra.
" 566 F.2d at 1210; see note 34 supra.
See text accompanying notes 42-46 & 65-67 supra.
See text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
The result reached by the Fourth Circuit was challenged by Butner in a petition filed
for certiorari which the Supreme Court granted on June 12, 1978. Butner v. United States,
436 U.S. 955 (1978). The petition, which presents four questions for review, challenges: (1)
the constitutionality of the administration of federal bankruptcy law to vary from circuit to
circuit on the question of the secured creditor's right to rents generated by encumbered
property, (2) the necessity of the mortgagee to make preliminary attempts to gain possession
of property in order to reach the rental income of mortgaged property of an insolvent debtor,
(3) the Fourth Circuit's disregard of the actions of the mortgagee during the pendency of the
Chapter XI proceeding in determining the mortgagee's right to the income generated by the
mortgaged property, and (4) the Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize the mortgagee's actions
under Chapter XI proceedings that converted to straight bankruptcy and thereby depriving
the mortgagee of his established rights. Butner v. United States, 47 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S.
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